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Abstract 
The year 2005 marks the end of transition period for many developing countries with competent 
pharmaceutical sectors that competed in supplying generic versions of patented drugs to LDCs 
before, thereby inducing price competition and enhancing access to medicines. In a post-2005 
scenario, the critical issue is whether LDCs without adequate manufacturing capabilities can 
make use of compulsory licensing expeditiously to induce price competition and secure lower 
prices. This paper uses empirical evidence collected during a firm-level survey of the Indian 
pharmaceutical sector to generate evidence on emerging strategies of firms. It shows that the 
vigour of compulsory licensing as a price-leveraging instrument post-2005 is incumbent mainly 
on its economic feasibility. It shows that Indian firms view the market potential (in terms of 
market size and profits involved in such supply, especially if they have to make specific 
technological investments to produce the drug) of the mechanism much more severely than 
before, and may be less inclined to engage in such production if their commercial expectations 
are grossly unmet. The analysis assesses implications of emerging strategies of firms in the 
Indian pharmaceutical sector for access to medicines both domestically and internationally, and 
highlights the challenges involved. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The recently released report of the Committee on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Health of the 
World Health Organisation (2006) urges developing countries to facilitate access to cheaper medicines 
by using creating national frameworks that enable the full use of their right to compulsory license the 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals (CIPIH, 2006, p. 139).1
 
The potential role of compulsory licensing in promoting access to medicines is replete with 
compelling issues. Within the highly contentious debate on the impact of the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement) on public health, poor 
countries have claimed that product patents on pharmaceuticals will lead to higher drug prices and 
access to medicine issues. The experiences of countries like Brazil and South Africa in 1999 led to an 
emphasis on instruments such as parallel imports and compulsory licensing in order to ease these 
impacts.2 A special weight was laid upon exercising the option of compulsory licensing within the 
TRIPS Agreement, or merely the threat of its use, as a price-leveraging instrument in developing 
countries. It was felt that this option allows national governments to impose the threat of price 
competition through the production of cheaper generic versions of patented drugs. To strengthen these 
means, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 2001 and the decision on 
the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, adopted by the WTO countries on 30 
August 2003 have tried to further the means by which developing countries can export drugs through 
compulsory licenses to least developed countries (LDCs) that do not have adequate local 
manufacturing capacities.3 The 30 August 2003 decision reflects the consensus of all WTO members 
to waive Articles (f) and (h) of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, so that counties with inadequate 
manufacturing facilities could make use of the compulsory license provision, especially after 2005. 
The Decision that culminated as an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, makes it clear that the 
obligation of a developing country to produce predominantly for the local market will be waived if the 
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importing country which is a least developed country/developing country seeking to import drugs 
manufactured under the said license satisfies the terms laid out by Paragraph 2 of the Decision. 
Paragraph 2 in turn, makes the compulsory license incumbent upon: (a) the lack of local capacity to 
manufacture; (b) a condition that the compulsory license issued by the exporting member will be only 
for the amount needed by the importing member; and, (c) a notification to the TRIPS council by the 
importing member for the grant of a license for a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency or a case of public non-commercial use. This allows developing countries to export 
drugs through compulsory licenses to other least developed countries that cannot manufacture them 
locally. 
It is not really a battle to win. There is no doubt that introduction of price competition through generic 
manufacturers is critical to ensure access to medicines.4 The WHO has also highlighted the impact of 
generic competition on price reduction, especially in a multiple source setting (Creese and Quick, 
2001). Price competition through generic manufacturers’ also has a role to play in introducing 
differential pricing in the market for drugs like those for HIV/AIDS (Hammer, 2002, p. 902). But 
whereas these aspects make the case for compulsory licensing so compelling, in practice, several 
issues remain open. One is forced to question the feasibility of this solution against the fact that 01 
January 2005 marked the end of the transition period granted by the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1995 (the TRIPS Agreement) to developing countries to 
comply with its provisions on pharmaceutical product patents. From this date onwards, pharmaceutical 
firms can obtain full scale patent protection on their products in major markets in developing 
countries, such as India, and also prevent local firms from manufacturing generic copies of their 
patented products. The introduction of product patent protection in countries such as India means that 
the firms in such developing countries which, in the past, offered strong price competition through the 
production of cheaper generic versions of drugs patented elsewhere, will now be able to produce them 
only through the 30 August 2003 solution. It remains to be seen how important this change will be, 
when compared to other factors affecting access to new medicines, especially for diseases that 
disproportionately affect India and other such countries. 
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1.1. The implications of the 30 August Mechanism in practice 
 
To exploit the Doha Declaration and the 30 August 2003 Mechanism, not only should LDCs be able to 
take complete advantage of delaying patent protection on pharmaceuticals in their national 
frameworks, but LDCs without adequate manufacturing facilities should be able to use the 
mechanisms introduced by the 30 August 2003 mechanism to obtain supplies from India or a different 
developing country under a compulsory license expeditiously. In practice, the vigour of compulsory 
licensing as a price-leveraging instrument will be incumbent on two conditions: the economic 
feasibility of compulsory licensing and the legal apparatus required to put it into action. The condition 
of economic feasibility implies that if compulsory licenses do not make much economic sense for 
potential generic producers (in terms of market size and profits involved in such supply, especially if 
they have to make specific technological investments to produce the drug), it will drastically reduce 
the potential of this mechanism to serve as an instrument to induce price competition in the global 
market. As Grace (2003, p. 49) rightly identifies, the 30 August 2003 solution poses two pertinent 
economic issues for generic firms in a country like India: 
(a) Does the compulsory license issued by an LDC serve as an economically feasible incentive for an 
Indian firm to invest in the development of a copy of the patented product? 
(b) If the active pharmaceutical ingredients required for the product are not available easily, is the 
market large enough to attract the firm to invest in the production of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients? 
The legal apparatus condition implies that the procedures spelt out for the grant of a compulsory 
license and the administrative costs imposed thereby should be minimal for it to be a powerful and 
easy-to-invoke option. However, the procedure spelt out under the 30 August 2003 decision is 
cumbersome. It not only spells out a lengthy legal process, but also places a substantial onus of 
administering the compulsory licenses on the TRIPS Council (Matthews, 2004). As a result, importing 
countries may have to face lengthy delays and costs associated with the administrative burden of 
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having to notify the WTO of their decision to use the mechanism and undergo scrutiny within the 
TRIPS Council before they can eventually proceed (Ibid, p. 97). Such procedural costs and delays also 
add to reduce its economic potential further. 
 
This paper focuses on a critical aspect of the debate on access to medicines: the economic feasibility of 
the compulsory licensing solution post-2005 and its potential to act as a price-leveraging instrument in 
markets in developing and least developed countries, using India as an example. The paper analyses 
the impact of India’s TRIPS compliance on emerging firm strategies for both R&D and business, in 
order to assess implications for both international and domestic access to medicines. The analysis is 
based entirely on primary data collected in a firm-level survey of the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
between October 2004 and January 2005. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the 
main issues raised by India’s TRIPS compliant product patent protection regime for access to 
medicines, namely: (a) which disease categories will be mostly affected? (b) what is the percentage of 
the drugs that will not be available for manufacture anymore and what implications does that have for 
public health? (c) what is the impact of these restrictions on manufacturing of generics on industry 
profits in a country like India? And (d) how will this affect industrial organisation and future trends, 
especially in relation to availability of generic drugs in major disease categories for LDCs? From 
section 3 onwards, the paper presents evidence gathered through the survey of the Indian industry on 
emerging firm strategies, industrial re-organisation trends, firm perceptions on economic feasibility of 
the compulsory licensing mechanism and the implications of these aspects on access to medicines in 
international and domestic markets. Section 6 contains the conclusions. It highlights the challenges 
involved in making compulsory licensing work to promote global public health. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
 
Several scholarly inquiries between 1995 and 2005 have tried to predict the impact of full-scale TRIPS 
compliance on the Indian market in general and strategies of Indian firms in particular (See for 
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example, Subramanian, 1995; Arvind, 1995; Lanjouw, 1998; Watal, 1999; Fink, 2000; Chaudhuri, 
Goldberg and Jia, 2004; and Grace, 2004). These studies have each examined various aspects of the 
patent landscape and its impact on the Indian industry using different methodological techniques, in 
order to predict the impact of product patent protection on the Indian pharmaceutical industry. In one 
of the earliest studies on the topic, Lanjouw (1998) analyses how the introduction of product patents 
for pharmaceuticals may benefit or adversely affect India. She bases her analysis on information 
obtained over a period of six months, September 1996-March 1997, in India through interviews with a 
wide range of people in the pharmaceutical sector. Through this and documents supplied by various 
pharmaceutical organizations and governmental agencies, she tries to predict whether one might 
expect or not expect to see changes occurring. 
 
Fink (2000) examines the impact of patent protection on the behaviour of pharmaceutical 
multinationals and the market structure in India. His analytical approach builds around the calibration 
of a theoretical model to actual data from the Indian pharmacy market, to answer the hypothetical 
question of what the market structure would look like, if India allowed product patent protection on 
pharmaceuticals. He concludes that in case new on-patent drugs are newer varieties of off-patented 
products in the same therapeutic class, it will not have a large impact on prices of drugs. But if they 
are altogether new products, of which off-patent generic versions are not available, price rises 
associated with such products may be high (see p. 29). The model also shows that the simulated 
welfare losses for the Indian consumers were quite large (p. 30). 
 
Grace (2004) and (2005) analyse the importance of pharmaceutical supplies from India and China for 
access to medicines on a global scale. She presents a review of the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and responses of the Indian firms to changes in intellectual property protection, mainly 
the introduction of product patent protection. The analysis is largely based on secondary data 
supplemented with select interviews conducted with informants in order to confirm information taken 
from reports (Grace, 2004, p. 10). 
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Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Jia (2004) use detailed product-level data sets from India to conduct a case 
study of Quinolones in India, to show the potential adverse welfare effects of the TRIPS Agreement on 
the Indian industry. They estimate that “in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory 
licensing, the total welfare losses to the Indian economy from the withdrawal of the four domestic 
product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub-segment would be on the order of US$ 713 million, or 
about 118% of the entire systemic anti-bacterials segment in 2000” (p.1).  
 
As opposed to these approaches, the data used in this paper was collected in a firm-level survey of the 
top 103 firms in the Indian pharmaceutical sector, ranked on the basis of their export potential, annual 
sales and R&D investment figures. The survey was conducted between October 2004 and January 
2005. An innovation system-oriented and policy-relevant innovation survey at the firm level is 
complex and not too many such surveys have been conducted in the pharmaceutical sector in India. 
Firm level innovation surveys generally aim at gathering information on innovation inputs (both R&D 
and non-R&D oriented) and outputs (usually in terms of products or processes of innovation) (Smith, 
2005, p. 161). Thus, firm level surveys incorporate the exploration of critical aspects of innovation, 
such as sources of innovative ideas, impetus to innovation, interactions between various actors in the 
innovation system, external inputs to innovation and so on (Ibid). A common weakness of earlier 
innovation surveys was that they were weakest in precisely the features of greatest utility: few 
innovation surveys carried out in the 1990s, for example, were consciously designed for policy-
relevance (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka et al, 2004). To avoid this, the main focus in the firm level survey 
conducted for this study has been on learning and innovation processes in Indian pharmaceutical firms 
and how these will be affected by stronger intellectual property protection and not so much on 
innovation inputs and outputs. The information generated in the firm level survey is used to analyse 
emerging firm strategies, both for R&D and business, and their impact on access to medicines in India 
and other countries in Africa. While doing so, the study also seeks to generate evidence for several 
theoretical predictions made in earlier studies on introduction of product patent protection in India. 
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A background country report of the Indian pharmaceutical industry was first prepared to feed into the 
survey. A range of semi–structured interviews with experts in the area of pharmaceutical innovation 
and intellectual property rights were conducted as the second step in order to help clarify the structure 
and content of the survey and to provide content validation to the survey questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was then administered to the top 103 firms in an industry list created using data on 
export potential, R&D investments and annual sales from online databases on the Indian pharma 
sector, such as the India Infoline and Pharmabiz. 
 
One of the key contributions of the survey in analysing emerging issues related to patent protection for 
pharmaceutical innovation and access to medicines in the Indian context is a categorization of firms in 
the Indian pharma sector into three main groups. This categorization, which was achieved on the basis 
of the country report and the empirical data collected, is very helpful in analysing emerging firm 
strategies and their implications in detail. The three groups are: large scale firms (both Indian and 
MNC-held), medium sized operators who are either generic producers or specialists in niche areas of 
contract research and small scale units which manufacture drugs for the bigger firms within India5 and 
will be refereed to as group 1 firms, group 2 firms and group 3 firms for the purposes of analysis in 
this paper respectively. These three groups are representative of the Indian pharmaceutical sector, 
which although amounting to approximately 6000 firms in total, engaged in the production of both 
bulk drugs and formulations.6 Since this categorization is corroborated by their export potential, ability 
to invest in R&D activities and annual turnover, it helps pin point the extreme variance in industry 
structure because it embodies the vast differences amongst firms in terms of firm size, employment 
capacity, innovation potential, R&D investments and exports. These differences condition strategies 
for R&D and business, and have implications for access to medicines in depth.7 Out of the 103 firms 
surveyed as part of the empirical investigation, 31 belonged to group 1, 27 to group 2 and 44 to group. 
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2. The Indian pharmaceutical sector, product patents and access to medicines: can we 
predict the impact? 
 
Indian pharmaceutical firms produce 22% of all generic drugs world-wide and also actively supply 
vaccines (Verma, 2005, p. 436).8 The sector has witnessed exponential growth rates over the 1990s, 
growing on an average, at 15% for bulk drugs and 20% for formulations (IBEF and Ernst and Young, 
2004a). The sector has an overall production value of US$ 10 billion, ranking 4th worldwide in 
production volume and 13th in value ((IBEF and Ernst and Young, 2004a, p. 8, Grace, 2005, p. 8).9 
Correspondingly, its export potential has also steadily been on the rise. As of 2005, 400 bulk drugs and 
almost all formulations that are sold worldwide were made in India (Grace, 2005, p. 8).  
 
India’s full scale compliance with the TRIPS Agreement proceeded in several stages up until 2005. 
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 introduced the mail box system and set up a system of exclusive 
market rights (hereafter, EMRs) to be retrospective from 01 January 1995, in conformity with the 
TRIPS Agreement. The Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002 introduced 64 changes to the Patent Act of 
1970, the most important ones of these being the extension of patent term from 14 to 20 years, and the 
reversal of burden of proof from patent holder to alleged infringer (see People’s Commission, 2003). 
The final set of changes to make India’s patent regime comply with the TRIPS Agreement in toto were 
first contained in the Indian Patent Ordinance of 2004, that has now been replaced by the Indian Patent 
(Amendments) Act of 2005.10 These stipulations are a far cry from the earlier Indian Patent Act of 
1970, which excluded product patent coverage for pharmaceutical products completely, and limited 
process patents to a period of seven years (or five years from the date of sealing of the patent, 
whichever was shorter). 
 
India’s full-scale TRIPS compliance raises several critical issues from an access to medicines 
perspective, namely; (a) which particular disease categories will be mostly affected? (b) what may be 
the percentage of the drugs that will not be available for manufacture anymore and what implications 
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does that have for public health? (c) What is the impact of these restrictions on manufacturing of 
generics on industry profits? And (d) how will this affect industrial organisation and future trends, as 
far as manufacture of generics for the poor of this world is concerned? Will firms shift their supply 
preferences and focus on developed countries instead? 
 
The disease categories most likely to be affected are categories of drugs with a high speed of new 
product development due to emerging resistance, such as antibiotics and anti-infectives (e.g. ARVs, 
TB drugs, anti-malarials), and new drug classes such as those for cancer and diabetes which have little 
therapeutic competition/substitution (Grace, 2005, p.7). Since only newer, patented medicines will be 
effective in these categories; these will be unaffordable in developing countries. Yet, as Grace (2005) 
notes, the public health ramifications of product patent protection could be quite big, since many of 
these drugs are critical for diseases that affect the masses, such as HIV/AIDS and Malaria, and more 
importantly, several of the patented drugs are one component of a combination therapy. This implies 
that their price drastically affects the possibility of optimal treatment to millions world-wide.11
 
The Indian Patent Amendment Act, 2005 has gone some way in enabling the production of generics, 
especially in some of these very affected disease categories such as HIV/AIDS. The Indian Patent law 
excludes drugs which have patent priority dates prior to 1995 from its purview: these cannot be 
patented in India and hence generic production can continue. But for drugs patented between 1995 and 
2005, the Act provides that these can still continue to be produced in return for payment of a 
“reasonable” royalty in case a generic firm within India has made “significant” investments (see Baker 
2005). These stipulations are weak, and may be the subject of future litigation since aspects such as: 
what is a “significant” investment, what is the ceiling on the royalty rate that needs to be paid, are all 
not defined (see Baker, 2005).  
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Table 1: Implications of the patent (amendment) Act of 2005 on some HIV/AIDS drugs 
Most antiretroviral therapies presently available for the treatment of HIV/AIDS are multiple drug 
combinations that require to be taken over a continued period of time. The presence of one patent-
protected drug in a combination therapy therefore acts as a major hindrance to efforts to make the 
combination available at affordable prices. For example, GSK’s patent on the drug 3TC effectively 
prevented the availability of the combination therapy of NVP, d4T and 3TC, which should otherwise 
have been the most affordable AIDS treatment worldwide. Despite such problems, there are several 
other combination therapies that will not be affected by the introduction of product patent regime in 
India. 
 
The fixed dose combinations of Stavudine/ lamivudine/ nevaripine can continue to be produced since 
all these drugs have pre-1995 patents. In the case of Tenofovir, although the patent was issued in 
1992, Gilead has a priority patent date for an ester/ salt of Tenofovir, Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumerate 
that has been granted in 1997. Cipla is presently manufacturing ‘Tenvir’, a version of Tenofovir 
Disoproxil Fumerate, which could be affected if Gilead is granted an Indian patent on the ester/ salt. 
Section 3 of the original Patent Act has been amended in the Patents Amendment Act of 2005 to 
exclude from patentability “salts, esters, polymorphs, metabolites….and other derivatives of known 
substance…unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy.” Therefore, it 
remains to be seen if Gilead will be granted the patent for the esther. Cipla could potentially engage 
either in pre-grant opposition or challenge the grant on the basis of Section 3. 
 
Combivir, on the other hand, contains two drugs that are pre-1995 – AZT and lamivudine. Both these 
drugs are not patentable in India since they are pre-1995. But GSK has a formulation patent on 
Combivir that was taken in 1997. Cipla took GlaxoSmithkline to court in the UK on grounds of “lack 
of novelty” for its patent on Combivir (GB2235627), which Cipla claimed was a combination of its 
earlier two ARV products, AZT (patent expiry date 2005) ands Lamivudin (patent expiry date 2007). 
Although Cipla won the case in the UK in 2004, GSK’s patent on Combivir is currently in the 
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mailbox in India.  
Source: Grace (2005), Gehl Sampath (2005). 
 
On the question of industry profits, however, there is some evidence that the introduction of product 
patents will lead to significant losses to Indian firms, at least across some product segments. A recent 
study conducted by Choudhury, Goldberg and Jia (2004) uses detailed product-level data sets from 
India to conduct a case study of Quinolones in India to show potential adverse welfare effects of the 
TRIPS Agreement on the Indian industry. They estimate that “in the absence of any price regulation or 
compulsory licensing, the total welfare losses to the Indian economy from the withdrawal of the four 
domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub-segment would be on the order of US$ 713 
million, or about 118% of the entire systemic anti-bacterials segment in 2000” (p.1). More generally, 
Grace (2005, p. 17) concludes that between 10-15% of the Indian production will be affected by 
product patent protection. Working with 2005 estimates, which quote the industry’s worth to be US$ 
10 billion, this will imply that approximately US $1 billion to 1.5 billion is at stake. 
 
How does all this affect industrial organisation and future trends for R&D and business within the 
Indian pharmaceutical sector? R&D investment has been steadily on the increase amongst Indian 
companies, and almost all company representatives interviewed from group 1 and 2 firms clearly 
indicated that their strategies for both R&D and business have been in a slow-but-steady transition 
over the past few years, in order to enable them to cope with India’s TRIPS compliance and ensuing 
strong international competition (field interviews). According to estimates, investment in R&D by 
Indian firms has gone up from a total of US $80 million on R&D in the year 2001 to over US $ 170 
million in 2004. Approximately 90% of all R&D investments come from group 1 companies, and by 
the year 2010, group 1 firms aim to invest 10% of their annual turnover into R&D (field interviews). 
These investments have also produced some results already: the number of drugs in Phase I and II 
trials have tripled from 5 in 2003 to 16 in 2005 (Grace, 2005, p. 8).  
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3. Patent protection and emerging trends amongst Indian firms12
The Indian pharmaceutical industry has come of age. Its major strengths include a cost-competitive 
manufacturing base that extends to clinical studies, extensive skills in chemistry and process 
development, ability to manufacture over 50% of the bulk drugs needed for its pharmaceutical 
production activities locally, the emergence of a promising biotechnology industry, availability of 
local scientists and R&D personnel of a high scientific quality and a wide network of organisations 
performing various aspects of pharmaceutical R&D (CII, 1999; IBEF and Ernst and Young, 2004a, p. 
2; Grace, 2004, p.18). Despite these achievements, there are several aspects that call for urgent policy 
reform. 
 
The lack of minimum good manufacturing practices applicable across the industry, and adequate 
regulatory enforcement of such standards is a major challenge facing the industry’s reputation. In 
recent years, there have been several contrasting estimates on the extent of spurious/counterfeit drugs 
produced in and exported by the Indian pharmaceutical industry (see Nature, 2005). These estimates 
vary between 0.5% (as presented by State authorities within India) and 35% (ascribed to WHO 
studies).13 Wary of the fact that such claims undermine the reputation industry as a whole, as a 
producer and exporter of quality drugs, the Indian government has taken several steps to remedy the 
issue, such as setting up an expert committee to review the situation, and the enactment of Schedule M 
of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act which is a regulatory initiative prescribing quality standards. The 
Expert Committee published its report in 2003, which contains a series of recommendations to deal 
with the issue. 
 
There are other gaps in the innovation system that could critically affect the performance of the 
industry post-2005. These include the lack of patent-related training at universities, and large 
regulation gaps in very important areas such as clinical testing and biotechnology (Ramani, 2002).  
While India is being promoted heavily as a clinical outsourcing hub, there are several regulatory 
aspects that may thwart India’s potential in clinical sciences. Apart from regulations preventing animal 
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testing within the country, that were until recently a big hindrance to Phase II clinical trials, the 
scientific and technological capabilities required for Phase II and III of clinical trials are very few and 
far between in the country.14 Recent initiatives include the setting up of three centres for clinical 
research in the country by the global firm, Quintiles and also expansion of operations within Indian 
companies to include performance of clinical research on a contract basis, such as Clinigene by 
Biocon (Maria and Ramani, 2004). Other global majors, such as Eisai, have also opened three centres 
for clinical R&D in India (D’silva, 2005). But problems persist, including the lack of trained staff, 
bureaucratic processes to accredit trials and scandals regarding unauthorized drug trails on the people 
(Padma, 2005, p. 436). The government of India is in the course of taking action on several of these 
aspects that require immediate attention, and the impact of these changes in fostering innovation 
remains to be seen. 
3.1. Emerging R&D and business strategies 
Emerging strategies of Indian firms are therefore a natural response to an industrial and regulatory 
climate that still is not fully able to cater to the needs and concerns thrown up by tough international 
competition, and the losses induced by the restrictions placed on them by the new patent regime. They 
are a mix of both cooperative and competitive strategies, in order to adapt and capitalize on 
opportunities created by the new industrial environment. These emerging firm strategies portray a 
scenario that is very different from what was observed in several Latin American countries, where 
local firms mainly adopted cooperative strategies upon entry of foreign MNCs, thereby leading to 
vertical integration (as a result of acquisitions) and steep increases in drug prices. The behaviour of the 
Indian industry is more in keeping with what one would expect to see in an environment where a well-
to-do local industry with clearly established areas of expertise is faced with strong international 
competition. Newer technologies and evolving market structures (in this case, as induced by the 
product patent regime and strong competition from global firms) almost always create new market 
segments and niches with many opportunities for specializations that the Indian industry is quick to 
capitalize upon, although this will also be accompanied by a high degree of consolidation in the 
industry in the coming years. 
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 On the whole, each one of the three firm groups are using a combination of competitive and 
collaborative options to deal with pressures imposed by India’s full scale TRIPS compliance. At the 
outset, three sets of predictive observations can be drawn on firm behaviour given the various 
pressures that the industry faces. 
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Table 2: Emerging firm strategies: a categorization15
Firm 
group 
Drivers R&D Strategies 
Group 1  • Entry and establishment in 
regulated markets 
• Realization that gains of entry are 
higher than initial costs to 
overcome barriers to entry 
• Need to strengthen product 
portfolios to insure against greater 
global competition 
• Greater investment into R&D 
through revenues earned by product 
sales in regulated markets 
• Higher innovation in generics, new 
products and processes and bulk 
drugs. 
 
Group 2 • Taking advantage of business 
opportunities created by the shift in 
focus of group 1 companies to 
regulated markets 
• Need to strengthen competitive 
advantages, to make use of CRAM 
opportunities 
• Active supply of off-patent generics 
to the semi-regulated and unregulated 
markets, by setting up manufacturing 
plants outside India or strengthening 
supplier partnerships 
• Focus on establishing themselves as 
niche players for contract research by 
choosing specific areas that give 
them competitive advantage: e.g., 
clinical research, domestic 
marketing. 
• Moving up the industry’s value chain 
gradually. 
Group 3 • Survival in the light of Schedule M 
of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 
and India’s full fledged TRIPS 
compliance 
• Upgrading facilities to Schedule M 
standards in order to continue 
manufacturing for group 1 and 2 
companies. 
Source: WHO-INTECH survey conducted by author, 2005 
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 Group 1 firms are keen on having their own intellectual property protection in order to establish 
themselves within India and other regulated markets worldwide, since they are capable of investing in 
R&D. These firms, which have a turnover of over 3000 crore rupees, perform two main kinds of 
pharmaceutical activity: generics production and innovative R&D. These two are overlapping, i.e., 
firms are venturing into innovative options of generic production such a specialty generics16 and are 
also keenly developing their own marketing infrastructure within India and other regulated markets. 
The need to set up marketing infrastructure abroad has led to several international acquisitions and 
alliances by Indian firms in the EU and the USA in recent times. The experience of group 1 companies 
has been that while the entry barriers to regulated markets for the supply of generics are very high, the 
monetary returns and the ease of business that follows entry into these markets are both higher than in 
the semi-regulated and unregulated markets worldwide (Field interviews). Added profits earned by the 
sale of generic products in regulated markets make it possible for group 1 companies to make larger 
R&D investments. Group 1 companies in India are therefore choosing a mix of cooperative and 
competitive strategies to deal with challenges and opportunities post-2005.17 Although most Indian 
companies clearly acknowledge that producing the next new blockbuster NCE (new chemical entity) 
in India is still some way off, most competitive strategies adopted by these companies are centred on 
enhancing their R&D focus. This includes the development of non-infringing processes, research on 
new chemical entities, generics and specialty generics for regulated markets, novel drug delivery 
systems and biopharmaceutical research (Interviews; IBEF and Ernst and Young, 2004a, p. 11). 
Cooperative strategies are predominantly focused on increasing internal technological competitiveness 
and higher revenues from greater sales in regulated markets by tapping the marketing networks of the 
non-Indian partners through collaborations. Some cooperative strategies are also geared towards 
helping MNCs use the marketing networks of Indian companies locally to market their products, in 
return for know-how or other desirable collaboration. 
 
Group 2 companies, which have an annual turnover between 100-300 crore rupees and have little or no 
investment capabilities to indulge in R&D, will predictably, remain pure generic suppliers, or at best, 
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shift to niche activities in product development that involves minor modifications. Their main focus 
will be on specializing in order to make use of emerging opportunities for contract research and 
manufacturing (CRAM). Towards this end, group 2 companies are trying to establish themselves as 
niche players in contract research and manufacturing by choosing specific areas where they can be 
competitive. Those who are planning to remain pure generic manufacturers are trying to quickly move 
in and capture shares in the semi-regulated and unregulated markets world-wide since the group 1 
firms are gradually moving out of these markets into regulated markets. 
 
In group 3 companies (annual turnover below 100 crore rupees), contrary to popular misconceptions; it 
will mainly be the enactment of Schedule M of the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act on minimum 
Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) that will force unviable units to close down, as opposed to 
introduction of product patent protection. This segment of the industry will perhaps witness maximum 
consolidation in the next decade. Although many of the group 3 firms are also strategically aiming to 
benefit from contract manufacturing, either for larger Indian firms or even for foreign firms post-2005, 
only those who can upgrade their plants to at least to the GMP standards as contained in the Schedule 
M of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act will tend to benefit. Even such a generalization has to be made 
with a note of caution, since the standards contained in Schedule M of the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act are much below the WHO standards on GMPs. In this context, it remains unclear as to whether 
group 3 companies that do upgrade their facilities to the standards specified under Schedule M can 
indeed target to manufacturing for MNCs/ firms operating outside India. In order to be able to 
manufacture for foreign partners from regulated markets, standards of foreign inspectors such as 
USFDA will need to be met by group 3 firms, which are much more stringent than both the Indian and 
WHO standards on GMPs. It therefore seems more likely that most such companies which do adhere 
to GMP standards as specified by Schedule M will manufacture for group 2 companies in India who 
are looking at filling in the demand for generics in the unregulated and semi-regulated markets or 
foreign partners directly from the unregulated and semi-regulated markets. Alternatively, group 3 
companies that comply with Schedule M will also supply to companies that are targeting the domestic 
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Indian market. Table 3 below contains an illustrative list of major competitive and cooperative 
strategies emerging in the Indian industry.  
 
Table 3: Main competitive and cooperative strategies adopted by Indian firms 
Competitive Strategy Examples 
Specialty generics Several development initiatives at both Cipla and DRL are 
actively focusing on the development of specialty generics. 
No infringing processes Ranbaxy’s non-infringing process on Cefuroxime Axetil 
enabled Ranbaxy to be its sole seller for almost one and a 
half years in the US market. 
Matrix Laboratories has developed its own non-infringing 
process on Citalopram and is the sole exporter of the API 
to Europe presently.  
Novel drug delivery systems Ranbaxy has licensed its NDDS on ciprofloxacin to Bayer 
AG that is under consideration in the USA right now. It is 
also actively involved in developing NDDS in several 
other therapeutic areas such as gastric retention. 
New chemical entities Ranbaxy licensed out its NCE RBx 2258 for the treatment 
of cancer to Schwarz Pharma AG. This NCE has now been 
dropped from clinical trials. 
Dr. Reddy’s had licensed out its molecule for the treatment 
of Diabetes (Balaglitazone) to Novo Nordisk in 1997, for 
carrying out toxicology studies that form part of Phase II 
clinical trials. This molecule also had to be dropped from 
clinical trials due to toxicity issues. 
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Collaborative Strategy Examples 
In-licensing arrangements Nicholas Parimal and Roche agreement on launching 
Roche’s products dealing with cancer, epilepsy and AIDS 
in the local market (CII, 1999, p. 23). 
Agreement between Ranbaxy and K. S. Biomedix Ltd 
accords Ranbaxy exclusive marketing rights for 
TransMID, a biopharmaceutical product used in the 
treatment of brain cancer in India with an option to expand 
this to China and other South East Asian countries (IBEF 
and Ernst and Young, 2004b, p. 26). 
Agreement between Zydus Cadilla and Fermenta Biotech 
Ltd (A subsidiary of Duphar Interfran Ltd) that gives 
Zydus process technologies to manufacture Lisinopril and 
Benazepril exclusively within India. 
Collaborative R&D Glaxo SmithKline and Ranbaxy have a collaborative R&D 
arrangement for the development of new drugs in the areas 
of infective diseases and diabetes. 
Cipla has established an R&D deal with a smaller 
biotechnology firm, Avestagen Laboratories to produce the 
biogeneric drug for Artritis, N-Bril. 
Ranbaxy and Avestagen Laboratories have collaboration 
for the production of NCEs using biotechnological 
techniques. 
Avenstagen has collaboration with Astrazeneca Research 
Facility to help develop their TB Dots products. 
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Contract research Biocon’s subsidiary Syngene performs a large range of 
contract R&D activities for pharmaceutical firms world-
wide 
Avestagen Laboratories, also a biotechnology firm, 
performs R&D for European pharmaceutical companies. 
Source: Field interviews conducted by author, 2005; IBEF and Ernst and Young, 2004b 
 
3.2. Patenting in the Indian industry 
 
The impact of intellectual property rights on specific sectors in developing countries will differ from 
one country to another depending on its level of development (Mashelkar, 2005). A point that is often 
brushed aside despite its obvious importance is that a tougher patent regime has significant advantages 
for the Indian pharmaceutical sector, given the stage at which it has reached now. Patenting activities 
have clearly been on the rise in India, accompanied by a growing realization that it is a primary factor 
in leveraging global competition to their advantage. There are segments of the industry which are 
benefiting from it extensively. Matrix Laboratories is a good example of a firm that is clearly 
benefiting from India’s compliance with the TRIPS Agreement (see Gehl Sampath, 2007 
forthcoming). 
 
According to Morel et al (2005), when the top 25 countries worldwide are ranked in order and 
analysed for all US patents issued where at least one inventor is from a given subject country, India 
ranked third highest (see Table 2, p.4). They further find that the number of US patents per GDP per 
capita in India is 0.912, second only to USA and Japan (ibid.). Despite this, since the Indian Patent Act 
of 1970 systematically under-emphasized the importance of patenting in the pharmaceutical sector, 
patenting is a relatively new phenomenon in the Indian pharmaceutical sector and there is a need to 
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enhance awareness regarding the implications and potential of patenting amongst a large number of 
smaller firms.  
 
Emerging patenting strategies of Indian firms fall into two broad categories – positive patenting and 
defensive patenting. Most Indian firms that perform innovative R&D are presently following a mixed 
strategy of both positive and defensive patenting. Positive patenting refers to the patenting strategy 
where firms use the patent system to secure their own products that are presently based on NDDS or 
polymorphs or novel combinations in Indian and other markets. Cipla, for example, has filed for 166 
patents world-wide, whereas Ranbaxy has the third largest ANDA filings in the USA for 2004 
(Interviews). Other Indian companies like Dr. Reddy’s Labs are also filing up to 15-20 ANDAs in the 
US market each year (IBEF and Ernst and Young, 2004a). At the same time, several firms are 
aggressively adopting defensive patenting strategies, where they apply for patents in order to prevent 
others from obstructing their R&D activities. Defensive patenting, as one company executive put it, is 
to ensure that “…someone else should not be able to stop us from developing our own processes” 
(Field interviews). 
 
4. The compulsory licensing option: less or more of “pills for the poor”? 
Sales from regulated markets have begun to account for a large share of total revenues of firms in 
group 1 of the sector – in 2005, the US market itself accounted for 32% of the total revenues of Dr. 
Reddys Laboratories and 42% in the case of Ranbaxy (Rangnekar, 2005). As highlighted in section 3, 
gearing up towards international competition has also meant that the three groups have invested on 
improving aspects that affect their competitiveness most, such as introduction of GMPs and receiving 
market exclusivity as “first-to-file” in the USA (Shalden, 2006; Gehl Sampath, 2005). But at the same 
time, the wave of industry consolidation and the emphasis on innovative R&D amongst firms that can 
upgrade their R&D and production facilities may have implications for access to medicines, because 
they are primarily motivated by the need to enhance competitiveness and not a public health vision. 
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4.1. The Legal framework for compulsory licensing 
Section 92 (A) of the Indian Patent (Amendment) Act 2005 embodies the 30 August 2003 Decision 
and is meant to facilitate the Indian industry to continue supplying cheaper generic versions of 
patented drugs to those LDCs that do not have adequate domestic manufacturing capabilities.  Section 
92 (A) deals with compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals for export purposes and reads as follows: 
 
“Compulsory licence shall be available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical 
products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector 
for the concerned product to address public health problems, provided compulsory licence has been 
granted by such country or such country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the 
patented pharmaceutical products from India.” 
 
Exports are not unrestricted to such countries: they are only allowed to countries that have ‘by 
notification or otherwise allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products from India’. 
The regime also provides for a three year period (starting from the date of patent approval) when the 
firms are not allowed to apply for a compulsory license. This requirement is much beyond what is 
stipulated under the TRIPS Agreement, and requires that firms wait for three years before applying for 
a compulsory license to produce the drug locally, except in cases of a ‘government declared 
emergency’ (Baker, 2005).  
 
4.2. Industry consolidation, LDC exports and the economics of compulsory licensing 
 
Figure 1 below contains the CHEMEXIL data for exports of the Indian industry as a whole to all 
regions world-wide. As the figure shows all of Africa accounted for only 17,019,2 million rupees in 
2003-2004, whereas Europe and North America account for almost 50% of all exports; a trend that 
continued in 2005. The 103 firms that participated in the survey confirmed this skewed distribution 
further. Emerging business strategies amongst the 103 firms revealed that presently only 42 firms, 
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spread across all three groups export to Africa. Another 42 firms export to other Asian countries and 
these firms were once again as in the case of Africa, equally divided between all groups. In contrast, 
the 40 firms that were exporting only to the European Union and North America predominantly 
belonged to Groups 1 and 2. 
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Figure 1: Region-wise distribution of Indian pharmaceutical and chemical exports, 2003-2004 
(Source: CHEMEXIL, 2004). 
Exports in Million Rupees
Asia and Middle 
East 43835.9
Africa 17019.2
East Europe 
13254.1
West Europe 
31542.7
North America 
24776
Latin American 
countries 
12401.9
 
 
On the face of it, this distribution indicates that a large proportion of the firms surveyed belonging to 
all three groups are supplying to African countries and other least developed countries and developing 
countries until now. But it also is indicative of a gradual, on-going transition in the industry structure 
vis-à-vis supplies to African countries presently, which will continue well into the future. The 
emerging R&D and business strategies of Group 1 pharmaceutical firms are geared towards ensuring 
profitable returns for their products so that they can continue to make large scale investments in R&D 
and compete at the global level. This mandates that their R&D focus is on global diseases and business 
strategies target to enhance their entry into regulated markets. This marked movement of group 1 
companies from the unregulated and semi-regulated markets to regulated markets will continue with 
group 1 firms tending to focus on getting a larger share of global regulated markets, and consequently 
giving secondary importance to semi-regulated and unregulated markets. Group 2 companies, on the 
other hand, will be quick to fill in the profitable opportunities that are being created by the shift of 
group 1 companies from unregulated to regulated markets. Some firms in Group 3 that are able to 
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substantially upgrade their production facilities will also make this transition and benefit from the 
possibility to export to semi-regulated and unregulated markets. 
 
To be able to test the economic viability of the compulsory licensing option provided by the 30 August 
Decision, embodied by Section 92 (a) of the Indian Patent (Amendments) Act of 2005, each firm was 
asked whether Section 92 (A) of the Indian Patent Act constituted a favourable economic incentive for 
exports, especially to LDCs? Of the 103 firms, only 25 firms thought it was an economically lucrative 
option, whereas 78 firms did not think so. Of the 25 firms who answered in the positive, a group-wise 
classification reveals that only 6 belonged to Group 1, only 4 to Group 2 and notably, 15 firms 
belonged to firm Group 3. The common reason given by firms in groups 1 and 2 for not considering it 
a lucrative option was that India’s TRIPS compliance increased the procedural hassles associated with 
such exports enormously, and that this was not worth their while, especially since the economic 
returns from such exports were very low. Group 2 firms also mentioned the constraints posed by the 
fact that their product range may be very different than those that might be in demand for imports by 
LDCs under such a license. These firms also expressed that the economic returns of investing in 
securing supplies of active pharmaceutical ingredients that are different from those that they normally 
require for their activities or investing into reverse engineering efforts and technological investments 
to produce the medicines will mostly not be profitable to them since it will be bound only to the said 
compulsory license.18 A common reason quoted by the 15 firms of Group 3 which were willing to 
supply to LDCs under a compulsory license was that decreased competition for exports to LDCs will 
enable them to strengthen their export potential. Table 4 below contrasts the general exports of firms 
in all three groups to Africa until now versus firm perceptions on how many of them would still find it 
lucrative to supply under Section 92(A) of the Indian Patent (Amendments) Act, 2005, as generated by 
the survey. As mentioned before, 42 out of 103 firms surveyed export drugs to African countries 
presently: 15 of these are group 1 companies, 12 of these are group 2 companies and 15 were group 3 
companies. But in response to the question whether they would still find it lucrative to supply generic 
versions of drugs patented in India post-2005 to African countries, not only did the total number of 
firms willing to consider the option reduce to 25 firms, the group-wise division changed drastically. 
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Table 4: Comparison between exports to Africa in 2004-2005 and export projections of firms 
under section 92(A) of the India’s new patent regime 
Firm Group Present exports to Africa Projections of future export 
intentions under sec. 92(A) 
Group 1 15 6 
Group 2 12 4 
Group 3 15 15 
Total 42   25 
Source: WHO-INTECH survey conducted by author, 2005 
 
At least three points are worth noting from these emerging business and R&D trends. Firms in groups 
1 and 2 will most likely continue to supply under compulsory licenses to LDCs so long as these 
generic products are the same as those that they were manufacturing pre-2005,19 although group 2 
firms will generally be keener. If these are generic versions of products patented between 1995-2005, 
according to the Patent (Amendments) Act, the firms can continue to produce them if they have made 
significant investments already, subject to payment of a royalty amount to the patent holder: the prices 
may experience slight rises in keeping with the royalty rates. If there is a demand for generic versions 
of newly patented drugs (that is, products that were not being manufactured by Indian firms in generic 
versions until 2005), firms in Groups 1 and 2 may consider supplying the least developed countries 
market under compulsory licenses., so long as commercial considerations are taken into account, at 
least to some extent20 In these cases, it has been suggested since long that LDCs will have a better 
chance with Group 1 companies in the case of newly patented drugs if they could aggregate demand 
regionally. A good example of this is the recent Clinton Foundation Initiative (see Table 6 below). 
Despite being keener, group 2 firms may be limited by process technologies and bulk drug 
requirements required, especially if the drugs in demand are very different from those that are being 
manufactured and exported by Group 2 firms to semi-regulated or unregulated markets normally. 
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Several Group 3 companies that answered in the positive are companies which have little or no 
experience in exporting pharmaceutical products mainly because they were not able to match up to 
competition from other Indian firms in Groups 1 and 2 before 2005. They see the export restrictions 
created by India’s product patent protection as an opportunity to enter LDC markets. This may not be 
a very feasible option, since most of these companies do not have facilities that are GMP-compliant. 
 
Table 5: The Clinton Foundation Initiative for HIV/AIDS Drugs 
The Clinton Foundation reached a landmark agreement with eight pharmaceutical companies in 
January 2006, which will have the impact of drastically lowering the impact of AIDS tests and drugs 
worldwide. As part of the agreement, Cipla, Ranbaxy and Aspen Pharmacare (South Africa), all of 
which rely on Matrix Laboratories (also an India firm) for their active pharmaceutical ingredients 
supply, will offer the ARV Efavirenz for USD 240 and Cipla will also offer the ARV Abacavir for 
USD 447. Efavirenz and Abacavir are second line ARVs used by patients who have developed 
resistance to first line ARVS or have shown severe side-effects. The deal undercuts the already 
existing low-priced ARV drugs by a further price reduction of 30%. As part of the deal, companies in 
India, China and Israel will also offer AIDS tests to poor people in developing and least developed 
countries for a price ranging from 49 to 65 US dollar cents. 
 
The reduction in drug prices of both Efavirenz and Abcavir were achieved by finding alternate (and 
cheaper) routes of sourcing the active pharmaceutical ingredients for their manufacture. Matrix 
Laboratories, which specializes in developing non-infringing propriety processes for the production 
of active pharmaceutical ingredients, now supplies the ingredient to manufacture Efavirenz at a very 
low price. Company co-operation in this instance was made easy due to the demand aggregation that 
the Clinton Foundation achieved: this offered profits large enough for a company like Matrix Labs 
despite the low rates for the ingredient. Mr. Nimmgadda Prasad, the Executive Chairman of Matrix 
Labs noted in this context: “They are really providing a very comprehensive assistance program and 
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are very sensitive to the commercial needs of the companies. Because the Clinton Foundation has 50 
eligible countries in its purchasing consortium, it offered high enough volumes to justify lower 
margins.” 
 
The reaction of Matrix Labs is clearly demonstrative of the situation most Indian companies are in. 
They are keen to supply and will continue to do so, including by developing new or alternate 
processes, but would like the initiatives to be sensitive to their commercial needs as well. Earlier 
efforts by the Clinton Foundation to secure first-line ARVs from Indian companies in 2003 also 
evoked similar responses. Pranesh Choudhury, the spokesman for Ranbaxy shared with the press at 
that time, that Ranbaxy which sold 2.2. million USD worth of ARVS in 2002-2003, would profit 
from the deal because of the large quantities of drugs involved.  
Source: Schoofs (2006), Agence France Presse (2003); Strides Press Release (12 January 2006). 
 
5. Access to medicines in the local Indian market 
 
Will product patent protection in India automatically increase the availability of new drugs within the 
local market? One of the first systematic studies on the topic shows that the grant of product patents is 
not a factor that directly affects whether new drugs are marketed in the country that grants such 
protection, and how quickly. The analysis covered a large sample of 68 countries at all income levels 
and includes all drug launches over the period 1982-2002, and found that the results on whether 
stronger patent protection leads to quicker product entry in middle and low income countries is mixed, 
with some evidence that in the short term, the chances that a strong patent regime leads to quicker 
product entry in countries that have good local facilities (Lanjouw, 2005, p. 24). In keeping with this 
finding, most executives from subsidiaries of large MNCs who were interviewed during the survey 
were very optimistic about the introduction of newly patented products in the Indian local market from 
2005 onwards. But they made it conditional on the full-scale implementation of the Indian Patent 
(Amendments) Act of 2005 (field interviews).  
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Assuming that these drugs are in fact made available within the country, it is likely that the newly 
patented drugs will be expensive, at least in the therapeutic categories where there are no generics 
available to offer price competition (Fink, 2000). But the definition of patentability, as contained in the 
Indian Patent (Amendment) Act of 2005 and its effectiveness in dealing with “evergreening” will also 
play a very large role in determining the nature of competition that Indian firms will be able to put up 
in the generics market. The new Section 3 of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 now 
contains an explanation that was inserted specifically to deal with the problem of evergreening.21 The 
explanation reads as follows: “For purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, 
metabolites….shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in 
properties with regard to efficacy.” A shortcoming though, is that it puts much of the onus to prevent 
evergreening on patent examiners (through pre-grant oppositions) and/or courts. 
 
In other cases where there are indeed newly patented products with no generic price competition in a 
given therapeutic category, the critical question will be: how many Indian people will be able to access 
them? Even if one/some Indian firms create novel drug delivery systems or other novel applications 
for such drugs, it is not likely to be of much help if a foreign firm/ MNC holds the molecule patent. 
 
Several other factors will also be critical in determining access to medicines for the Indian population 
in the mid-term or long-term, apart from product patent protection issues. Some of the main ones that 
require immediate attention in the Indian context are discussed here. Others, such as health 
infrastructure and distribution systems, availability of adequate financial resources, rational selection 
of medicines, are all very important but beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
5.1. Competition law issues and compulsory licensing for the domestic Indian market 
 
The provision of the original Indian Patent Act of 1970 that linked the grant of a compulsory license to 
“working a patent” locally has now been deleted in order to comply fully with the TRIPS Agreement. 
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Despite some of the other provisions in the Act that still preserve some of the old vigour of 
compulsory licensing, it remains to be seen how this will play out in practice. Indian administrative 
authorities, including the judiciary, have very little experience in dealing with patent-related issues and 
disputes. The global pharmaceutical industry, on the other hand, has proved to be fertile ground for 
anti-competitive practices many of which are promoted by accumulation of patents by firms, such as 
coercive bargaining, hold-up effects, and unfair terms in license agreements between firms that share 
research results (see for example, Correa, 2000). Although India has an enabling competition law 
framework in place, there is a lack of awareness of issues in intellectual property-competition policy 
interface that practices in the global pharmaceutical industry may give rise to. As a result, it is highly 
likely that post-2005, Indian competition enforcement agencies will be over-whelmed by the 
magnitude and diversity of competition law issues in the pharmaceutical sector. The grant of ‘patent-
like’ rights in case of all patent applications between the date of publication and approval of patent is a 
provision in the present regime that can have severe consequences for competition (Baker, 2005, p. 2). 
It is especially likely that as a result of this provision, foreign firms will still make patent applications/ 
claims on salts/ esters/ polymorphs or other substances excluded from patentability, aimed at 
preserving their market share in the local market, at least for a short while.22: This leaves one clearly 
reminiscent of cases of false listings by pharmaceutical companies in US FDA’s Orange Book, just so 
that generic entries by competitor firms can be delayed.23
 
In addition to such competition issues posed by the entry of global pharmaceutical players into the 
Indian industry, marketing practices within the Indian market itself are a cause for concern. Present 
pharmaceutical marketing culture in India creates a large potential for collision between medical 
representatives of pharmaceutical firms and doctors/ hospitals, in order to influence the brands of 
drugs that are prescribed. For several decades now, the general practice amongst Indian firms was to 
produce their drugs under brand names. Business strategies therefore, were mainly aimed at promoting 
brand names to consumers. Lanjouw (1998) notes, “… [e]arly entrants with strong brands seem to 
have a persistent advantage in the market.” Since the market operated with immense product 
differentiation with each firm offering the same/similar product under a different brand name, and 
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since there is virtually no information for the consumer to differentiate amongst the various brands of 
the same products, quality control is through a firm’s reputation and doctor’s prescription of certain 
brands over others (field interviews). 
 
This creates the scope for a typical vertical restraints problem that can only be dealt with by an 
efficient competition law framework. For example, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories holds a dominant market 
position for their Nimersulide brand Nice: the brand controls 70% of the market, a large part of the 
success being attributable to the presence of extensive brand marketing networks with thousands of 
sales representatives. Indian companies also indulge in giving large margins to retailers in order to 
promote their brands (Field interviews), and it is common practice that most of the large firms in 
group 1 have extensive brand marketing networks for their brands. Cipla, for example, has a sales 
force of around 2500 representatives within India (field interviews). Smaller firms that may have 
equally good products at competitive prices but no marketing infrastructure may end up with 
insufficient profits, due to the difficulties of marketing their products. The emerging cooperative in-
licensing alliances between MNCs and large local firms need to be viewed against this reality. They 
may, in fact, help thwart competition from smaller firms within the Indian industry that do not have 
large marketing infrastructure, even within those therapeutic categories where generic price 
competition is possible. The costs of these practices, if they continue unabated, will eventually be 
borne by the uninformed consumer in the Indian market.24 In an effort to eliminate price distortions 
that are caused by high retail trade margins in the sector, a decision of the government of India (dated 
08 January 2005) has had the effect of bringing all drugs and medicines (other than traditional 
medicines) under the maximum-retail price based excise assessment. This has brought about an end to 
the earlier practice of levying excise duty on drugs on the ex-factory price, which meant that 
companies could make significant profits by selling drugs at prices that were much higher than the ex-
factory price and thus offer significant margins to traders to promote their products (Nagendranath, 
2005). 
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The dependence on the medical professionals to prescribe brands to patients goes beyond generic 
products. Since the normal practice amongst Indian doctors is to rely on drugs that are published in 
major British medical journals, like the Lancet, Indian firms fear the situation that when they do come 
up with completely new products, they may not be able to market them. A good example of this is 
Cipla’s Kelfar, a new drug introduced in 1995 (See discussion in Chaudhuri, 2005, p. 18). This 
deferiprone drug was very hard to promote within India, although it was a good substitute for the only 
other deferiprone drug in the market, produced by Novartis at the time (ibid). According to Cipla’s 
Managing Director, Dr. Hamied, drugs like Kelfar failed to capture the local market because of the 
reaction of Indian doctors (Pers. Comm, Dr. Hamied, 2005). 
 
The usual practice amongst the Indian judiciary of referring to cases from USA and Europe to 
substantiate decisions will only exacerbate the situation and may go against the interests of the Indian 
industry and public health concerns. Over and above all this, India does not have a large number of 
qualified and experienced patent examiners. The lack of qualified patent examiners and the time lapse 
between the grant of a patent and its publication in the official Gazette that the industry can access are 
other issues that need immediate attention (field interviews). 
5.2. Data exclusivity  
 
There is a clear distinction between keeping information secret (data protection) and doing approvals 
and clinical work “relying” exclusively on the original patent holder’s data submitted to obtain 
regulatory approval for the patented product (data exclusivity). Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement 
places a requirement upon member countries to provide protection to regulatory data under specific 
circumstances. Data exclusivity, a relatively new form of protection, is one such form of protection 
and it refers to the protection of pharmaceutical registration files that contain data submitted by 
pharmaceutical companies to regulatory agencies, such as the US Food and Drug Administration and 
the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA), for the purposes of obtaining 
market approval of patented drugs (Pugatch, 2004). Grant of data exclusivity prevents generic 
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companies from using the test data submitted by the original patent holder to regulatory authorities to 
prove bioequivalence of the generic version of the products. In practice, data exclusivity terms, since 
they are granted from the date of introduction of a particular product in a given market, may have the 
effect of extending the monopoly term of the patent holder beyond the term of the patent and delaying 
the entry of generics. 
 
There seems to be no clear economic justification as to why data exclusivity should be granted to firms 
that already avail a patent protection term of 20 years globally for their products. It has been argued 
that data exclusivity allows firms to rely on some form of protection when they introduce their 
products, especially since they cannot be sure whether all countries will grant effective patent 
protection. But this form of “back-up” protection mechanism seems to be unnecessary, especially 
since the TRIPS Agreement has circumscribed the ability of countries to deny patent protection under 
normal circumstances to a very large extent. Furthermore, in the light of recent evidence which 
suggests that strong levels of intellectual property protection may not have such a direct bearing on the 
decision of pharmaceutical companies as to when they introduce their products in different markets 
world-wide (Lanjouw, 2005), one wonders if data exclusivity can be defended on this basis. In fact, 
grant of data exclusivity terms seems to contravene principles of bioethics, since it forces generic 
manufacturers who wish to introduce generics before the expiry of data exclusivity periods to generate 
their own test data through the conduct of clinical trials. Furthermore, a reading of Article 39(3) of the 
TRIPS Agreement shows that although there is a requirement to provide protection to regulatory data 
under specific circumstances, it is not necessary that this protection is granted in the form of data 
exclusivity (Watal 2001; Correa, 2002; Chaudhuri, 2005). Article 39(3) gives countries the choice to 
countries to decide upon the form of protection. 
 
India is presently under pressure from the USA to consider granting five year data exclusivity (Baker, 
2005). Assuming hypothetically that a developing country like India granted data exclusivity of five 
years, this would mean the following in reality. A product for which a patent was granted in 1995 is 
valid until 2015.  But if this product is introduced in the Indian market in 2013, then data exclusivity 
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in Indian law would protect the regulatory data submitted by the company until 2018 (5 years from 
introduction), thus delaying the entry of generics (and extending the product monopoly) by three more 
years than the twenty years granted under the patent. Generic firms will then have to reproduce costly 
trials to prove bioequivalence of the drug, without which they cannot obtain market approval for the 
drug even if they can legally produce it (Baker, 2005). 
 
Such a sui generis regime of data exclusivity goes beyond what is provided by the TRIPS Agreement. 
India should clearly assess its impact on public health in terms of delayed entry of generics and wasted 
expenditure of Indian generic companies in duplicating costly trails before acceding to such demands 
on a bilateral level (CIPIH, 2006, p. 143-144, see recommendation 4.20). 
 
5.3. Price control and its effectiveness post-2005 
 
The Indian Drug Price Control Order was first introduced in 1970 and amended several times until 
recently when it was replaced by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy of 2002. Price control has 
played a very important role in ensuring access to medicines. According to government authorities, 
rise in prices of medicines under price control is only around 1%, whereas medicines that are not 
under price control have had an average price rise of around 7% in the past decade (Pers Comm., G. S. 
Sandhu, 2005). Yet, there are several problems with price control and its scope as it is operating in 
India presently that undermines its effectiveness.  
 
Previous experience with price control shows the acute trade-off between accessibility and 
affordability. Both local Indian companies and MNCs do not find the introduction of drugs in price-
controlled categories lucrative. Therefore when price control was imposed on a particular drug, more 
often than not, they either discontinued its production or created other deviations. The Price Control 
Order relies mainly on ORG data to assess prices, which takes into account only retail prices.25 
Therefore, prices of drugs for very important diseases, such as HIV/ AIDS and Cancer, are left out of 
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the scope of the Order, since most of the drug supply in the case of these diseases is institutional (such 
as to hospitals) and escapes the economic criteria of the Order. The drug categories in the Order are 
completely out-dated. Although the criteria was meant to prevent cartels of drug manufacturers from 
exploiting consumers, the present Order relies on 1990 selection of drugs. As a result, Naproxyn, an 
analgesic is still under price control for several years now, although other analgesics, such as 
Ibuprofen and Diclofenac are not. The categories of illnesses listed in the Price Control Order are 
outdated, and does not contain any reference to neglected diseases. These need to be re-defined so that 
neglected diseases and other important health priorities get sufficient attention under the price control 
mechanism. 
 
Lastly, the price control mechanism as it operates today, does not effectively control the prices of 
imported drugs. The practice under the Order for imported drugs had been to allow a margin over 
“landed” costs (cost of the drug/ active pharmaceutical ingredient when it lands on Indian territory). 
This practice has been problematic in the past because it is hard to monitor price collusions between 
any Indian importer and exporter of raw materials/drug. Previously, subsidiaries of MNCs operating 
within India have used this loophole to claim inflated prices for raw materials imported from their 
parental companies into India (Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001, p. 430). This problem will become 
much more acute from 2005 onwards, since patented products do not have to be produced locally. 
 
For the price control mechanism to be effective to help in dealing with price rises accompanied with 
product patent protection in the local Indian market, these issues need to be eliminated. The 
government of India has constituted a Sandhu Committee that is looking into these matters in great 
detail. The aim of the committee is to reinforce accessibility of drugs in the post-2005 scenario by re-
defining the categories and basis for price control (Pers. Comm., G. S. Sandhu).26
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6. Conclusions 
 
There is no doubt that intellectual property protection is not the only factor affecting access to 
medicines, but at the same time, consensus seems to be emerging on the fact that it can be an 
important one (see CIPIH report, 2006; Gehl Sampath, 2005; Grace 2005, among others). The 
foregoing analysis has focused on a very important impact aspect of the access to medicines debate: 
the reduced economic feasibility of the compulsory licensing solution post-2005 which directly affects 
its potential to act as a price-leveraging instrument in markets in developing and least developed 
countries. The focus has been on India’s TRIPS compliance and emerging firm strategies for both 
R&D and business based on primary data collected during an industry-survey between October 2004-
January 2005. The Indian industry is in a stage of consolidation not only due to the ratcheting up of 
intellectual property, but also due to India’s new standards on good manufacturing practices (GMP) 
and the pressures imposed by dealing with loss of industry profits and increased foreign competition in 
the local and international markets at the same time. Emerging strategies of firms for both R&D and 
business are therefore mainly tuned in to protect themselves in this hostile climate and less tuned to 
access to medicines issues. In order to analyse this in-depth, the paper divided the pharmaceutical 
sector in India into three groups of firms, depending on their annual turnover, export potential and 
R&D investments. Some of its main findings are as follows. 
 
India’s full scale TRIPS compliance will only affect newer, patented medicines, especially those that 
are being patented post-2005. These will be very few, but the impact will be sizeable, since it will 
affect disease categories that show a high speed of new product development due to emerging 
resistance, such as antibiotics and anti-infectives (e.g. ARVs, TB drugs, anti-malarials), and new drug 
classes such as those for cancer and diabetes which have little therapeutic competition/substitution 
(Grace, 2005, p.7). These disease categories affect the masses world-wide, and lack of access to the 
state-of-the-art treatment in for such diseases will be a great loss. 
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Emerging strategies in the Indian pharmaceutical sector are not dictated by access to medicine 
concerns, as much as other commercial pressures. This is clear by the preference of groups 1 and 2 to 
move slowly into majorly supplying the regulated markets in order to increase profits. Innovation 
trends amongst the first two groups analysed by the author elsewhere (see Gehl Sampath, 2005) also 
show a large preference for global diseases in an effort to increase profits so that they can invest larger 
amounts into R&D.27
 
Although several firms presently supply to African countries from all the three groups, the results of 
survey clearly shows that the inclination to continue to supply under Section 92(A) of the Indian 
Patent (Amendments) Act of 2005 has declined. Firms repeatedly reiterated two main reasons for their 
decline in interest. The first reason is that the new regime increased procedural hassles associated with 
such exports enormously, and that this was not worth their while, especially since the economic 
returns from such exports were very low. Secondly, they expressed concern that constraints posed by 
the nature of demand: their product range may be very different than those that might be in demand for 
imports by LDCs under such a license. Firms expressed the concern that the economic returns of 
investing in securing supplies of active pharmaceutical ingredients that are different from those that 
they normally require for their activities or investing into reverse engineering efforts and/ or other 
forms of technological investments may not be profitable to them since it will be bound only to the 
said compulsory license. On the whole, although firms expressed their willingness to continue to 
supply, there is a marked transition in export trends away from such markets. The most significant 
change is that Indian firms (especially in groups 1 and 2) no longer view the production of generic 
versions of newly patented drugs (patented post 2005) as a profitable activity, since their ability to 
supply them to different markets and profit from increased sales is highly circumscribed by India’s 
TRIPS-compliant regime. This does not mean that firms will not supply generic versions of important 
drugs; it only means that in future, efforts to induce them to produce a newly patented drug under a 
compulsory license may require parallel arrangements, such as regional aggregation of demand by 
countries which do not have significant manufacturing capabilities. The paper has given the example 
of the recent Clinton Foundation Initiative to make this point. Although the Indian Patent 
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(Amendment) Act, 2005 has gone some way in enabling the production of generics including those 
that have patent filing dates between 1995 and 2005, there are still numerous ambiguities in the legal 
regime. The stipulation under the new patent regime that bans the grant of a compulsory licensing in 
the first three years of a patent only exacerbates the situation on the access to medicines front. 
 
Hence, the analysis in the paper leads us to make a preliminary conclusion that compulsory licensing 
in a TRIPS-compliant regime, as provided for by the 30 August 2003 decision will not have the same 
vigour as a price-leveraging instrument as in the pre-2005 scenario. This is in keeping with the 
findings of the recently released CIPIH report on the issue of compulsory licensing. The report notes 
that (p. 136): “Generic producers in both developed and developing countries argue that there remain 
economic and procedural barriers to their participation in these arrangements (59, 60). Although their 
business models are different, generic companies share with the research-based industry the common 
motivation of serving the interests of their shareholders. The mechanism will not be used if the 
financial incentives for participation, taking account of the risks involved, are deemed inadequate. 
Whether this mechanism is capable of making supplies of lower cost drugs available to developing 
countries with inadequate manufacturing capacity remains to be seen. So far no developing country 
has sought to make use of it.”28 More research on this is needed to substantiate these results, so that it 
paves the way for timely and relevant policy action in international and national forums. 
 
The paper has also some assessed other aspects that will affect access to medicines in both domestic 
and international markets. Whereas the grant of data exclusivity in India will affect both markets, 
factors such as India’s competition policy and price control will predominantly shape public health 
considerations for the Indian population. India itself has the second largest population of HIV/ AIDS 
patients worldwide (Mitra, 2004; Shadlen, 2006), and therefore exploiting each option that enhances 
access to medicines to the fullest will be critical in the domestic context. Other interesting linkages 
between drug registration procedures, data protection, exclusive market rights and access to medicines, 
although important, have not been explored in this paper (Baker, 2004; Hill and Johnston, 2004; 
DFID/ HSRC, 2004). 
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 Several problems on the demand side too are likely to affect the situation pervasively. To begin with, 
the state of patent laws in many African countries like Kenya and Malawi are already at the TRIPS-
plus levels although these countries have the option of not complying to the TRIPS Agreement until 
2016 (DFID/ HSRC, 2004, p. 7). Although since 2003, several developed countries (including Canada, 
the Netherlands, Norway) have amended their laws to allow for exports to countries with inadequate 
manufacturing facilities, no developing country has made use of CL option as provided for by the 30 
August 2003 mechanism this far (CIPIH Report, 2006, p. 136). Experience with other countries in 
Africa that have used compulsory licensing to improve access to medicines before 2003 shows that 
they required most help in negotiating royalties (Pers. Comm., Jamie Love, 2005). Given the fact that 
the compulsory licensing mechanism as it stands now has substantial limitations due to its limited 
economic feasibility, one is forced to question whether LDCs can use this mechanism as a price 
leveraging instrument at all. Political pressures on LDCs also raise considerable scepticism as to 
whether countries may invoke this mechanism in the future, and to which extent. The watered-down 
economic potential of the instrument will only help patent holders’ keenness to withhold their market 
positions and pricing levels.  
In the light of all this, it may not take a long time until consensus gathers on the recommendation 
made on this point by the CIPIH: “The WTO decision agreed on 30 August 2003, for countries with 
inadequate manufacturing capacity, has not yet been used by any importing country. Its effectiveness 
needs to be kept under review and appropriate changes considered to achieve a workable solution, if 
necessary.”29
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technologies. 
17 This is mainly applicable to the Indian firms in Group 1. The subsidiaries of MNCs that belong to this group  
are also planning to expand operations in the country or enter into collaborative arrangements but are waiting to 
see how well the Indian Patent (Amendments) Act, 2005 is implemented before implementing their course of 
action. 
18 Since a lot of new medicines encompass biopharmaceutical or other novel techniques, they may require 
technological investments and are also costly to reverse engineer (Grace, 2003). 
19 This can mean either pre-1995 molecules that are not covered by the TRIPS-compliant patent regime, or 
products that are generic versions of molecules patented between 1995-2005, but local firms can show that they 
have invested significantly into building such generic production activities and thus get exempted, as Indian 
Patent (Amendments) Act of 2005 provides. 
20 Some group 1 firms, notably Cipla, are extremely dedicated to continue producing generics of newly patented  
products. Cipla is the largest producer of generic drugs in India with around 800 products in the market in 2005 
(field interviews). It has several R&D deals to continue with generic production of newer drugs, such as the 
collaborative agreement with a smaller Indian biotechnology firm, Avestagen Laboratories to produce the 
biogeneric drug for Artritis, N-Bril. 
21 Evergreening is a process through which the original patent holder firm can delay the entry of generics upon 
the entry of the patent. Common evergreening tactics include applying for patents on slight modifications of the 
drugs (salts, esthers, polymorphs, among others) or applying for recombination patents (drugs that simply 
combine two earlier drugs into one dose/ tablet) or even apply for a patent on very basic changes like a different 
dosage route. 
22 The Glivec case which is being contested by Natco Laboratories, Hyderabad is an example of this problem. 
The Natco brand Veenat 100 Imatinib is priced at Rs. 10,800 as opposed to Glivec’s price of $3600 for 100 
capsules. 
23 Under US law, a listing delays FDA approval of a generic product by 30 days. See Lancet (2002) for a 
discussion of the case where Bristol-Myers Squibb was charged with falsely listing a patent claim for Buspirone 
in the US FDA’s orange book in order to delay generic entry. 
24 A 2002 study conducted by VOICE and NPPA (National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority of India) on the  
availability and prices of medicines in India found that more than 60% of the patients consult chemists rather  
than doctors to decide which medicines to buy (See VOICE and NPPA, 2002). 
25 ORG-MARG is India’s premium market surveillance and consulting firm, whose audits provide detailed  
product-level information based on monthly retail sales. 
26 In this context, an amendment to Schedule H of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act has also recently been enacted. 
27 See Gehl Sampath (2005), p. 53-54. 
28 Footnotes 59 and 60 read as follows: Koen, J. Canadian Generic Industry, Ottawa, CIPIH Country Visit, 
October 2004 and Proposal of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Compulsory 
Licensing of Patents Relating to the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products to Countries with Health Problems, 
Brussels, EGA Position Paper, March 2005. 
29 See recommendation 4.15 on p. 139 of the report. 
 
 55
